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Introduction: theoretical assumptions
1 Several examples of previous revitalization policies showed that the strategy of using
culture as a means for economic recovering purposes seems relevant. Since traditional
approaches  to  the  fight  against  unemployment  and  urban  decline  have  lost  their
legitimacy,  nonorthodox  strategies  have  become  popular,  the  idea  of  a  “cultural
enhancement of the economy” (Lazzeretti, 2009) obtaining surprisingly much support.
Earlier trials started in the 1980s when many old industrialized regions of Europe were
faced  with  the  need  for  a  high  level  of  economic  restructuring.  During  this  period,
important innovations occurred also as a result of internal forces of the cultural sector:
new  museum  start-ups,  renovations  of  existing  museums,  renewal  of  the  role,  the
organization and the management of  museums in modern society,  and new forms of
cultural  projects.  Later  on,  policy initiatives  were  undertaken  on a  European  level,
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illustrated by the European Capital of Culture Programme. At the end of the 1990s, the
British  Department  of  Culture,  Media  and Sport  (DCMS)  played a  pioneering  role  in
stressing the linkages between culture, innovation and economic development (DCMS,
1998; 2001). If not completely, at least in part, can the important upsurge of new museum
projects be explained by this new vision of culture as a “magical recipe” for development
(Sacco et al.,  2013),  since it provided new legitimacy to public spending on culture in
difficult times. While it seemed to be more difficult to legitimize public expenditures, the
lack of available solutions in times of recession contributed to the paradox that cultural
projects often appeared as a promising alternative strategy, even if they ended up being
rather risky and most of them eventually failed (Rauterberg, 2004).
2 This paradoxical configuration even allowed recognizing cultural creativity as a central
element  of  post-industrial  and  knowledge-based  economies  (KEA  2009).  The  cultural
economy therefore attracted increased attention from scholars and decision makers due
to its supposed spill-over effects on other sectors (Cooke & Lazzeretti, 2008; Towse, 2011).
But most of the literature focuses on large, international cities, showing the continuity
between  previous  creative  cities  and  the  newly  globalized  creative  cities  of  today
(Andersson  et  al.,  2011).  Studies  of  the  relationships  between  culture  and  urban
regeneration  in  restructuring  areas  and  more  specifically  of  the  possible  impact  of
museums in smaller industrial cities are more recent (Zimmerman, 2008; Lusso, 2009;
Breitbart, 2013).
3 In the present article,  the development of our argument is based on the issue of the
decentralization of national museums and the resulting creation of subsidiaries which
follows multiple objectives requiring the mobilization of  different kinds of  resources.
According  to  our  hypothesis  cultural-related  technical  know-how  or  even  financial
resources are not sufficient to guarantee their success. Indeed, social factors seem to be
more decisive for the successful realization of a major cultural project. On the one hand,
this represents an outstandingly costly and complex project which requires a relatively
high level  of  cooperation between the various actors,  because it  cannot be sustained
solely or by a selected group. On the other hand, it requires a high level of social support
offering  a  minimum  of  socially  constructed  opportunities  as  well  as  an  important
relational campaign towards established actors, which implies somewhat strategic action.
4 From a theoretical point of view, we will assemble the concepts of social embeddedness and
organizational field developed in economic and organizational sociology. The problem of
embeddedness  has  been  largely  discussed  by  Mark  Granovetter  (1985),  proposing  a
critical view of the concept firstly used by the economist Karl Polanyi (1944). For our
purpose,  we take the idea that  the intention of  creating new museums represents  a
multidimensional  strategy,  mixing  cultural,  social,  political  and  economic  goals  that
intertwine,  making  it  impossible  to  study  them  separately  from  each  other.  This
argument  further  implies  that  the  success  of  the  project  depends  largely  on  the
mobilization  of  different  kinds  of  resources.  The  neo-institutionalist  concept  of
organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) helps us to take into account the need for
legitimacy  of  new  practices,  the  creation  of  a  new  museum  as  an  organizational
innovation taking place in the context of an organizational field where it has to obtain
legitimacy from the other actors. 
5 We have chosen to focus on the upstream process of the social embeddedness, instead of
approaching the immediate effects of the cultural object, which, by the way, would have
been difficult in view of the infancy of the projects considered here. We will describe the
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genesis of the projects and study the implication of their development at national and
local levels, particularly in regard to their location choice and their governance structure.
We will also consider the extension of the relationships between the different actors in
the economic sector. Our analysis is based on empirical research that has been realized in
2011 and 2012 (see Krauss, 2013; 2014; Baudelle, 2013).
 
The case of the Centre Pompidou-Metz1
Genesis of the project and key actors
6 The  decision  in  favor  of  the  decentralization  of  a  museum  reflects  the  innovative
potential of the cultural sector in France. It represented uniquely an essentially national
project, even if the major protagonists were also quite well affiliated to the international
scene of  great  cultural  institutions.  The idea came from the President  of  the Centre
Pompidou at the time, Jean-Jacques Aillagon, i.e. the initiative was taken autonomously
by a major national cultural institution and not the Ministry. The way how the project
started up, was decided and then developed, reflects a non-profitable approach to culture
in  the  public  sector,  typical  of  France  and  in  direct  contrast  with  the  commercial
franchising model of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. In addition, it also symbolizes a
renewal of the characteristically French logic of cooperation between the administrative
center (Paris) and the periphery (the region) in cultural affairs.2
7 The  initiative  was  put  into  place  for  three  main  reasons.  Firstly,  the  excessive
concentration of  cultural  institutions in Paris  generated inequalities  in the access  to
culture.  Secondly,  creating  a  second  Centre  Pompidou  outside  Paris  meant  making
culture available to the population. Furthermore, as a national institution, the Centre
Pompidou had the mission to play an active part in decentralization policy. Thirdly, it was
inspired by existing examples of the world’s leading museums, in the setup of subsidiaries
and  spin-offs  like  the  Tate  Gallery  in  Liverpool  and  St.  Ives  or  the  Guggenheim
Foundation in Venice, Abu Dhabi and Bilbao. 
8 Lastly, the creation of the Centre Pompidou-Metz was the result of a lucky meeting of two
types of actors: the President of the Centre Pompidou and its National Museum of Modern
Art searching for possible locations for the creation of a second Centre Pompidou and
hoping to expand the museum’s public, by the introduction of an exhibition programme
for  the  province  and alternatively  for  local  officials  interested  in  the  economic  and
symbolic benefits of a new cultural facility for their locality. A tacit consensus seemed to
exist among the outstanding cultural decision makers and the local politicians, such as
the  Mayor  of  Metz,  that  the  cultural  initiative  would  generate  economic  spill-overs
effects.  Lorraine had been confronted by high unemployment  rates  in  its  traditional
manufacturing  industries  and  in  the  military  sector.  The  instigators  also  hoped  to
improve social cohesion, identity, reputation and image. Even if their main objective was
to  bring  culture  closer  to  the  citizens,  this  goal  could  not  be  separated  from  the
socioeconomic aspects.
 
The institutional construction of the Centre
9 Originally,  the funding capacity  of  the local  authorities  was  seen as  decisive  for  the
realization and long term survival of the new Centre Pompidou. The original objective
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was to bring in only know-how and collections for temporary exhibitions, but no financial
resources. So the collection for the new Centre would be constituted only of loaned art
pieces, being predominantly in the property of the Centre Pompidou Paris. This did not
necessarily mean a relationship of dependence. On the contrary, the Centre Pompidou-
Metz benefits from a relatively high artistic, conceptual and scientific autonomy, being
not simply an antenna of the Parisian Centre. The exhibitions conceived in Metz and
shown exclusively there are oriented mainly towards modern art in order to reach a
larger public. Instead of being limited to contemporary and experimental art aimed at a
selective public of connoisseurs already well covered by other cultural institutions of the
region, it poses an alternative to those such as the FRAC (regional fund of contemporary
art) or the Synagogue of Delme, a renowned center for contemporary art.
 
Governance structure and the center-periphery relationship
10 The  Centre  Pompidou  represents  a  nationally  and internationally  renowned  brand,
illustrating the specific center-periphery relationship between the mother institution in
Paris and its sister in Metz on one side, and the relationship with local decision makers on
the other. The reference to the image of the Centre Pompidou, including its emblematic
late  20th Century  architecture  of  Renzo  Piano  and Richard  Rogers  in  the  Beaubourg
district of Paris, comes irresistibly. It was clear from the beginning that this link had to be
conserved in the innovative architecture that would become an emblematic building for
Metz.
11 On the  operational  level,  the  Centre  Pompidou  brand is  used  like  an  appellation  of
controlled origin, guaranteeing high quality standards. The programming work of the
team in Metz is controlled by the Centre Pompidou Paris. Prior to formal submission,
however, things generally have already evolved in advance thanks to regular exchanges.
The first director of the Centre Pompidou-Metz was, himself, a former museum curator of
the Centre Pompidou in Paris residing between Paris and Metz. In fact, the governance
structure grants an important power of the Parisian Centre in the control of the brand
use,  in  a  deciding  minority  on  the  Board  of  the  Centre  Pompidou-Metz  and  in  the
designation of  its  president,  ex  officio  president  of  the  Centre  Pompidou-Metz,  both
privileges not easily obtained amongst local officials. 
12 With regard to the funding,  the stakeholders agreed that  the Centre Pompidou-Metz
could borrow the different works for its exhibitions for free from the Centre Pompidou in
Paris,  whereas Bilbao has to pay important fees to the Guggenheim Foundation.  The
formal division of the tasks originally stipulated that all major resources be provided by
the local  authorities (region,  metro area,  municipality).  Finally,  three quarters of  the
budget were to be financed by them (the remaining quarter being private funding).
13 The asymmetric funding dissimulated ongoing conflict relationships between the local
actors and Paris. After the initial success, the number of visitors has declined –500,000
during the first six months in 2010, 550,000 in 2011, 475,000 in 2012 and 335,000 in 2013–
while an increasing part has free entrance. This led to first important losses and to a
controversial  debate  about  the  funding.  The local  authorities  refused  to  pay  any
supplementary fees and the regional council even decided in early 2014 to reduce its
contribution to the operating budget of the Centre Pompidou Metz from 4 to 3 million
euros per year, thus increasing the pressure on the Centre to find alternative sources of
private  funding.  Several  criticisms  were  addressed  to  the  Centre  Pompidou-Metz,  in
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particular its temporary exhibitions.  Visitors from outside the region often had been
disappointed  when  they  came  in  a  period  when  no  exhibition  was  in  place.  A  new
strategy, extending significantly the period of loans of art pieces, proposed a half way
solution  between  the  classical  distinction  of  permanent  collections  and  temporary
exhibitions.
 
Networks, spill-over effects and the social embeddedness of the
Centre Pompidou-Metz
14 Regardless of this recent crisis, much had been done to favour social embeddedness. Prior
to the opening, the cooperation with local actors was sought, to insure that the Centre
Pompidou would not be simply dropped into the region from Paris and that it would not
threaten the other regional cultural institutions with which collaborative projects were
set up in a complementary way. In this way, the cultural networks around the Centre
Pompidou-Metz could be strengthened. 
15 Finally, these networks also involved the business sector. In this regard, the development
agency of Metz metro area played a central role for the formation of economic relevant
networks  around  the  Centre  Pompidou.  However,  important  institutions  remained
distant. The local economic actors were accustomed to a certain status quo that hindered
them from perceiving the new opportunities offered despite important awareness-raising
campaigns to attract investors. The effects of special events in the Centre Pompidou-Metz
or lease of spaces to companies in order to promote networking and as symbol of local
economic support revealed to be selective. It is not clear if culture will become a catalyst
for creativity and innovation in the long term. Most of the SMS companies cannot afford
renting spaces and do not see an interest in acting as sponsors.
 
The similar case of the Louvre-Lens3
Also a project initiated by two main public actors sharing common
objectives
16 The Louvre-Lens has opened in Lens at the end of 2012. This subsidiary results from the
meeting  of  two  smart  leaders  sharing  the  same  concern  for  the  need  for  culture
dissemination in new communities:  Henri Loyrette,  then the head of the Louvre,  and
Daniel Percheron, the president of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais regional council.  These two
pioneers  were  very influential:  Loyrette  was  close  to  the  Minister  of  Culture  and to
President Chirac himself and Percheron is a well-established regional politician who has
understood for  a  long time the decisive  importance of  a  culture-based revitalization
strategy as proven by the “Lille 2004” European Capital of Culture success (Paris, Baert,
2011) due to its fantastic branding effect. Consequently, he was willing to engage the
region’s financial resources while the Parisian Louvre was looking for new sources of
funding. 
17 The starting point  was the 2003 statement  of  the former Minister  for  Culture,  Jean-
Jacques Aillagon, in favour of the partial relocation of central cultural institutions outside
Paris, especially the overcrowded Louvre for which public pressure acted as a push factor.
Bordeaux and Lyon were interested but several arguments made Northern France more
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attractive: a less seasonal frequentation, the opportunity to attract visitors from North-
Western  Europe  and  the  lack  of  other  great  regional  cultural  institution,  reducing
competition risk. An agreement was concluded between the Louvre and the Nord-Pas-de-
Calais  regional  council.  Such a  partnership has  become usual  in  the French political
system following the 1980s decentralization laws, which saw introduction of normative
multiyear covenants between the State and the regions. 
18 Yet, the hosting city remained to be chosen. A call for tenders was launched by the cities
of  Nord-Pas-de-Calais.  Seven  applied.  The  president  Percheron,  a  native  from  Lens,
prompted its mayor to apply.  Finally this anonymous former coal-mining borough of
36 000  inhabitants  (part  of  a  conurbation of  half  million  people)  was  chosen by the
Minister for Culture for reasons which were not primarily of economic order: the lack of
museum; a location in the heart of a densely populated region of 4 million inhabitants
near Paris and within the European megalopolis;  the quality of  the rail  and highway
accessibility; an available, central and attractive site already owned by the municipality;
the popular support motivated by the want for the so-long expected Nation’s gratefulness
expression for the mining population’s sacrifice to serve the industrial development of
the country. Above all the choice of a declining city completely unknown abroad must
refer  to  the  main  objective  of  cultural  democratization  within  a  broader  regional
redevelopment policy.  In this  respect a working city is  seen as a proper location.  Of
course  the  members  of  the  regional,  metropolitan  and  municipal  councils  knew the
economic and symbolic benefit they may derive from the Louvre, especially after the
field-trip organized in Bilbao, but this direct impact remained secondary compared with
the initial will to attract new people to museums and the wider long-standing regional
strategy of economic reactivation through education and culture.
 
A multidimensional strategy requiring extensive cooperation 
19 The  extension  of  the  world’s  most  famous  museum  of  fine  arts  in  a  completely
unexpected and declining city was a huge challenge. Indeed, the most surprising is the
host city –and the most famous is the museum–, the riskier is the project implementation.
That is the reason why such a project required cooperation between a wide range of
actors to make it successful. The determination of the two decisive actors allowed them to
involve new stakeholders.  The “Grand Lille” strategy that had led since the 1990s to
Olympic  Games  candidacies  (that  failed)  and  to  European  Capital  of  Culture  (that
succeeded)  and to  the location of  a  new CBD connected to  a  new HST international
railway station have shown how efficient a collective effort  aiming at  obtaining new
equipment and organizing events could be. The Lille model was as powerful as the Bilbao
one to such extent that the urban planner Jean-Louis Subileau, who successfully saved
Euralille WTC which was threatened in the 1990s real estate crisis, was called to manage
Euralens, the urban planning body created to supervise the urban renovation process
connected to the Louvre settlement. 
20 From a theoretical point of view a growth coalition has considerably enlarged the initial
circle to stakeholders initially unconnected so that the museum decision-making process
has led to an innovation within the organizational field, in accordance with our central
hypothesis of the need for embeddedness. Taking advantage of the well-known principle
of  shared  funding  and  routine  contract  procedures  in  France,  the  regional  council
mobilized other funding sources (see box). 
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Box: The Louvre-Lens subsiders
Regional Council of Nord-Pas-de-Calais : 59 %
Other local funders (12 %): Conseil Général (Pas-de-Calais Département), City of Lens,
Lens Metropolitan authorities
European regional development fund (ERDF): 20 % 
Private sponsors: 5 %
Central State: 4 %
21 These initial networks are surprisingly more regional than international even if the call
for tenders’ procedure opened them up to foreign actors (Baudelle, 2013). This regional
embeddedness  was  the  guarantee  of  a  supporting  relay.  The  network  progressively
widened to other spheres. The technical committee involved various partners such as the
sous-préfet of Lens and the head of regional cultural affairs (Direction régionale des affaires
artistiques  et  culturelles –  DRAC).  Euralens  includes,  besides  the  local  authorities,  the
Chambers of  Commerce and Industry,  Artois  University,  Lens football  club,  transport
actors, stakeholders involved in culture and tourism and the Mission Bassin Minier, the
former  coal-mining  area  development  agency.  The  sub-prefect  has  greatly  and
unanimously mobilized many players from all sides to seize the unique opportunity of the
Louvre arrival in order to spur economic reactivation. Besides the Louvre project team,
the cultural sphere is present: the other regional museums, the tourist organizations and
various local cultural facilities.  The expansion of cooperation dynamics is very likely,
sketching a regional network of cultural cities and generating a spin-off effect that led to
describe the Louvre-Lens as a “cultural hub at the service of its region”. The learning effect
from Lille 2004 European Capital of Culture, which has already spread in the form of
exhibitions and performances seen in other cities throughout the region as well as in
Belgium, is obvious. 
 
The governance: a balanced center to periphery relationship
22 The Louvre and the regional councils have been associated in close partnerships both in
the  steering  committee  and in  the  operational  committee.  The  original  appropriation
committee, another  joint  structure,  demonstrates  the  high expectations  in  regards  to
future regional attendance. The scientific committee is controlled by the Louvre and its
curators. The Louvre-Lens shares the same president as the Louvre-Paris but has its own
head. While the Louvre initially wanted to make the Lens museum a department of the
Parisian Louvre only, the local and regional public authorities assigned the control of the
management of the museum. The majority of the Board of directors’ seats of the EPCC
(Public institution of cultural cooperation) was attributed to them. They elected both the
President (Henry Loyrette) and the head (Xavier Dectot). Therefore the level of political
autonomy is higher than the Centre Pompidou-Metz, showing a more balanced center-
periphery relationship.
23 The Louvre-Lens  also  benefits  from a  scientific  autonomy.  The artistic  design of  the
museum results  from discussions  between the  Louvre  and  the  regional  council. The
Louvre-Lens has no proper collection, only semi-permanent ones. These pieces of art do
not come from the Louvre storage rooms but mainly from its currently exhibited Parisian
collections.  For instance,  the Delacroix masterpiece “Liberty Leading the People” was
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shown in Lens at the opening exhibition.The organization of temporary exhibitions aims
at maintaining a constant attractiveness. The level of funding for the Louvre itself is very
low, but it brings its collections (that are loaned), its prestige, its know-how and its label
as a trade-mark without any financial requirement in contrast to the Abu Dhabi business
model. 
 
A cultural and social success but an unclear economic impact 
24 The public success is undeniable as instead of the 700,000 expected visitors, attendance
reached 900,000 people in the first year, 20 % foreigners from 70 different nationalities.
56 % came from the region, 100,000 people from the former coalfield, indicating "a real
ownership both local and regional public" according to the director. The free entry offered
the first year has been renewed in 2014, so that one million entries was recorded as of
January 2014, only thirteen months after its opening, making the Louvre-Lens the first
French museum in the province! 500,000 visitors are expected over the coming years
because of the centenary celebrations of World War I and to the 2016 European Football
Championship. 
25 Regarding the spill-over effect, private sponsoring is noticeable (box). Around ten million
Euros  have  been  collected.  Two  firms,  Veolia  and  Crédit  Agricole,  are  “exceptional
sponsors”, the other “great sponsors” are banks, an international retailer from the region
(Auchan), the global leader in cabling systems Nexans (that provided the museum for
free) and Orange. The others include a bank, the local semi-public real estate company
owner of the housing stock inherited from the former public collieries, an automotive
company from a neighbouring city (Française de mécanique) and amazingly the Great
Lille  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  in  order  to  contribute  to  a  geographical
balanced development. 
26 More time is needed at this stage to measure the possible long term impact of the project
both  on  urban  regeneration  and  on  local  and  regional  economic  restructuring.  The
perspective  of  using  the  museum  as  a  catalyst  faces  current  lack  of  local  creative
industries. Many firms are subsidiaries of large foreign companies operating essentially
in industries extensive in human capital and technology. Moreover the education level
remains as low as the number of students (2,700). The strategic study achieved under the
guidance of the sous-préfet has identified five potential poles of excellence connected to
the museum: logistics,  eco-products for building,  sport  and leisure,  crafts  and digital
skills. But presently the potential is actually very weak. 
 
Conclusion: a governance model far from Bilbao 
27 Our case study of national museums recently created in old industrial regions shows a
governance model very different from Bilbao Guggenheim. Private donors are weak in
these mainly public projects, reflecting the typical French approach to culture conceived
in the non-profit  sector to be made accessible  to a larger audience.  In addition,  the
initiative came from national level, followed by the local authorities who acted as the
principal funders, the municipalities being palpably only followers. The close relationship
between the State representatives and the local political staff make the museums jointly
developed  projects  that  have  led  to  a  coalition  building  process.  In  view  of  the
institutional construction, a small circle of major actors played a decisive role in the
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initial pulse. But cultural projects are more likely to succeed when the initial leaders are
relayed  by  other  stakeholders.  Thanks  to  their  influential  charisma  and  visionary
building capacity, the key actors have been able to generate this further support. Our
major hypothesis is therefore confirmed, the case studies showing the necessity for the
initiators to be socially embedded in an extensive,  enlarging social  network to other
regional  stakeholders  but  also  to  partners  belonging  to  various  professional  and
geographical areas, including famous architects and planners of the global circuit thanks
to international contests. 
28 However  no  real  glocalization happened:  the  main  public  remains  more  regional  –
including  the  neighbouring  countries–  than  global.  Far  from  the  Bilbao  model,  the
decentralization process was neither an opportunity to make money nor to increase the
international  visibility of  the involved cultural  institutions.  The expectations of  local
politicians are somewhat different, waiting some positive repercussions on the regional
economy and image in conformity with the archetypal model. But the economic impact
outside the direct touristic benefits is still expected, perhaps due to a dominantly public
commitment more focused on the management of the cultural institutions themselves
than oriented towards the seek for spill-over effects on territorial development.
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NOTES
1. For more detailed presentation of our research on this case (methodology, period of empirical
enquiry, research sample), see Krauss (2013; 2014).
2. For a description of the typical features of the French public sector approach to culture, as well
as the system of cultural policies in France, see for example, Mollard (1999; 2012), Poirrier (2009),
Poirrier/Rizzardo  (2009),  Urfalino  (1996),  Négrier/Teillet (2014),  Dubois  (1999),  Dubois  et  al. 
(2012).
3. For more detailed presentation of our research on this case see Baudelle (2013).
ABSTRACTS
The article analyses recent cases involving the creation of subsidiaries of two internationally
renowned museums: the Centre Pompidou in Metz and the Louvre in Lens. At first glance, these
projects seem to be attempts to reproduce the prototypal Bilbao model defining the mobilization
of new cultural equipment for an economic recovery purpose. However the case studies, based on
numerous interviews of the main protagonists, show that this original decentralization process
of two famous institutions in former industrial cities did not mainly respond to economic goals
but to cultural ones. From a theoretical point of view, our assumption is that only the creation of
a  social  network  dynamics  makes  their  success  possible  so  that  we  interpret  these  cultural
projects as triggers for setting in motion previously segregated actors. 
L’article  analyse  deux  cas  récents  d’installation  en  province  de  musées  de  réputation
internationale : le Centre Pompidou à Metz et le Louvre à Lens. A première vue, ces exemples
apparaissent  comme  des  tentatives  de  reproduction  du  modèle  de  Bilbao défini  comme  la
mobilisation d’un nouvel équipement culturel à des fins de redémarrage économique. Ces études
de  cas,  fondées  sur  de  nombreux  entretiens  avec  les  principaux  protagonistes,  montrent
toutefois  que  ce  processus  original  de  décentralisation  de  deux  institutions  célèbres  dans
d’anciennes villes  industrielles  n’a  pas obéi  à  des objectifs  principalement économiques mais
culturels. Sur le plan théorique, nous faisons l’hypothèse que le succès imposait la formation de
réseaux entre acteurs jusque-là séparés, de sorte que ces musées ont servi de déclencheurs. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: musées, modèle de gouvernance, réseaux sociaux, décentralisation, Louvre-Lens,
Centre Pompidou Metz
Keywords: museums, governance model, social networks, decentralization, Louvre Lens, Centre
Pompidou-Metz
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